

Reliability and Availability of Particle Accelerators: Concepts, Lessons, Strategy

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Accelerator Reliability Community




Canada = Particle Accelerator Community

Decades of experience designing accelerator systems without formal reliability engineering studies

Reliability Engineering applied to particle accelerators is a relatively new discipline, based on industry best practices and methods


Developed very consistently over the last years – why?

“Dependability”




NB: in the context of particle accelerators, we speak about ‘Protection’ rather than ‘Safety’, if no personnel is involved


Discussions are ongoing in the particle accelerator community to tailor these definitions to different machines ([Accelerator Reliability Workshop](#))




Low Importance
Relative Importance
High Importance



Large-Scale Colliders




Synchrotron Light Sources




Large-Scale Colliders

Availability




Synchrotron Light Sources


Availability




Spallation Neutron Sources




Accelerator Driven Systems



Spallation Neutron Sources




Accelerator Driven Systems



Why is availability a concern for the scientific output of all facilities?

Costs, Reputation, Damage potential

Cost vs Availability




- Given a target performance reach (neutron fluence, number of patients treated, luminosity production, ...), an optimal balance between capital costs and operation costs must be found
- This is an **absolute MUST** for the feasibility of next-generation machines

Dependability Studies: if yes, when?

Prof. Dr. B. Bertsche, Dr. P. Zeiler, T. Herzig, IMA, Universität Stuttgart, CERN Reliability Training, 2016

- Product Lifecycle: 'Power-of-10 Law'



- The earlier reliability constraints are included in the design, the more effective the resulting measures will be

Today: Dependability Studies

Concept Phase

**Technology
Feasibility
Assessment**

Design Phase

**Technology
Definition and
Implementation**

**Exploitation
Phase**

**Technology Field Use
& Optimization**

Upgrade Phase

**New Technology
Definition and
Implementation**

**Reliability
Studies**

Future: Dependability Studies

Concept Phase

**Technology
Feasibility
Assessment**

Design Phase

**Reliability
Studies**

**Technology
Definition and
Implementation**

**Exploitation
Phase**

**Technology Field Use
& Optimization**

Upgrade Phase

**New Technology
Definition and
Implementation**


Reliability and Protection Analyses: LHC was a Game Changer

First particle accelerator with damage potential beyond repair


Requirement 1: Must have Machine Protection Systems (MPS)

Requirement 2: MPS must meet very strict reliability requirements

Requirement 3: MPS must not trigger unnecessary beam interruptions



Machine Protection: Interlocks



LHC:

Several 10-thousands → complex

Several km → distributed


❑ Perform **controlled removal** of beams in case of failures:

- Circular accelerators (e.g. LHC): Beam dump (100 μ s – ms)
- Linear accelerators (Linac4, ESS): Beam stop (1-10 μ s)


❑ Improve availability by preventing consequences of severe failures

❑ Affect availability by triggering unnecessary ('false') beam aborts

LHC Machine Protection Layout



LHC Machine Protection Layout



- Quantitative reliability analyses performed for protection-critical systems
- Inspired by European Standards for safety-critical electronic systems

Since the beginning of LHC operation (2010):

**0 beam-related accidents
(achieved: high level of protection)**

**Few unnecessary beam aborts caused by MPS
per year**

**(observed: low impact on availability, mostly
related to radiation effects on electronics)**

Does It Always Work? (Linac4)



Linac4 Damage

- 1) Severe misalignment in the low-energy section
- 2) Optics that favoured amplification of this misalignment (test)
- 3) Phase advance such that the loss occurred on the “wave” of the bellow (200 μm) and it is an aperture limitation




06/01/2014

Accidents might occur due to a combination of different factors (change of boundary conditions, non-standard operation, design flaws, human errors, timing constraints...)




**Explicit Integrated Luminosity
Production Goal
3000 fb⁻¹ over HL-LHC Lifetime**





**Explicit Integrated Luminosity
Production Goal
3000 fb⁻¹ over HL-LHC Lifetime**



The adoption of luminosity levelling shifts the focus on increasing availability to increase luminosity production


STEP1: Measure availability

STEP2: Predict performance (model) as a function of availability




Step 1: Failure Tracking At CERN

- Since 2015 at CERN, **Accelerator Fault Tracker** in use to keep consistent records of accelerator system reliability and availability during LHC lifetime
- Used to estimate system failure rates and recovery times
- Consolidated over 3 years of operation, now widely accepted by system experts



LHC System Downtime in 2017




Failure Duration




- **Accelerator specific:** some time might be required to recover nominal operating conditions (e.g. beam-tests, source stabilization, magnetic pre-cycles,...)
- Optimising accelerator **maintainability** will be fundamental for future large-scale machines

Step 2: From Data to Models



- 6.5 TeV
- 134 days of p-p operation
- 2016 fault distributions
- 2017 beam parameters (estimated at the beginning of 2017)
- Achieved in 2017: Integrated Luminosity = 50 fb^{-1}



- Observed failure modes in 2017 different than in 2016, but overall similar achieved availability + good guess of beam parameters
- **Important:** order of magnitude of the results is correct → realistic prediction of integrated luminosity (validated for several years of LHC operation)
- **More important:** possibility to simulate impact of different scenarios on luminosity production


Application: Protection vs Availability

Dust macro-particles interacting with the beam (UFOs)

Losses are detected by Beam Loss Monitors (BLMs)

Premature beam dumps + (in some cases) a magnet quench

Thresholds of BLMs should be optimized to limit impact on operation




- Achieving high **availability will be a key requirement** for the success of next-generation particle accelerators and needs to be pursued from early design phases

**High Reliability
and Protection**




**Redundancy
Fault Tolerance**




High Maintainability



**Failure Prediction
Advanced Diagnostics**



**Robotic
Maintenance**



TOTAL AVAILABILITY

(B. Todd, R. Schmidt, L. Felsberger)

